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EGYPT'S REVOLUTIONARY ELECTIONS

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BIOS

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Map 1 (Egypt): University of Texas Libraries

Egypt's parliamentary elections of 2011 and 2012 were revolutionary in several ways. They followed a historic mass uprising that broke the back of the military regime that had ruled the country for 60 years. In that sense, they were post-revolutionary events that helped a still shaken society to settle down and regain its footing. However, as we grasp the extraordinary scope of voter participation and the dramatic power shifts it unleashed, we realize that the elections continued and deepened the revolution – indeed, that they came to embody the revolution and reveal more fully its profound implications for social as well as political change. And if we consider the uprisings and the elections together, it is even more evident that Egypt's revolution has just begun. The closer we examine the voting patterns as well as the partisan alliances and counter alliances, the more we understand that in district after district – in city, town, and countryside – Egypt's divisions and dreams were everywhere on display with a poignancy and desperation that we have never before seen so clearly and that we will learn to expect as commonplace in the near future and for many years to come.

Voters and candidates from all regions and persuasions showed enormous sophistication and pragmatism in using their new freedom and power. Through multiple rounds of choosing between shifting combinations of programs and personalities, they decided how best to reward friends and punish enemies even when the final alternatives seemed unappealing or downright loathsome. In constantly weighing and re-weighing second-best and third-best choices, they often had to compromise and share power with rival groups both locally and nationally. Adversaries in one district frequently became allies in other races in which they faced stronger enemies that could only be defeated with common efforts. Even when no formal nationwide coalitions existed, candidates brokered tacit pacts district-by-district, contest-by-contest, and round-by-round throughout the three month election marathon.

The pluralism and fluidity of electoral competition exposed all of Egypt's worst cleavages – class, religious, and regional animosities that authoritarian rulers had smothered and manipulated for three generations with little opportunity for genuine representation or independent negotiation. At the same time, however, the elections also revealed some striking and encouraging resources among Egypt's new political elite, particularly a talent for compromise and an appetite for cooperation that could be indispensable in its efforts to draft a new constitution and to manage a contentious era of coalition government.

NATIONWIDE ALIGNMENTS OF THE MAJOR PARTIES

A handful of parties dominated the elections (Appendix A). The top six parties won 93 percent of the total vote and the top four won 88 percent (Appendix C). Only the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) demonstrated anything approaching nationwide coverage. The Salafist Nur Party, the Wafd, and the newly formed Egyptian Block enjoyed strong support in regional bastions, but not beyond. The Wasat Party of "centrist" Muslims and The Revolution Continues Party of Tahrir Square youth leaders turned in disappointing performances even by their own accounts (Appendix D).

The deepest partisan cleavages by far were the common antipathy to Nur and to the remnants of the National Democratic Party (Table 1). Everyone ran against the old regime, but their ancient hatred for Mubarak was soon exceeded by their growing fear of the Islamic radicals. And as Nur became the universal adversary, the Ikhwan became the preferred firewall for liberals, both secular and religious, who sought to protect Egypt's democratic experiment against twin authoritarian threats – from the plots of disgraced elites eager for revenge and from the smoldering fury of the poor who were no longer invisible. Overall Ikhwan support had no strong negative correlation to vote for either the Wafd or the Egyptian Block; all three parties were more opposed to Nur than to one another.

Table 1*

Intercorrelations between Votes for Major Parties in Party List Districts (Pearson's r , $N = 46$)

	Wafd	FJP	EB	NDPs	Seculars
Nur	-.3346	-.3969	-.4499	-.4786	-.8447
Wafd		-.0569	-.2879	.1664	.3270
FJP			.0781	-.1767	-.1560
EB				-.0824	.4412
NDPs					.6181


* The correlation coefficient is a measure of the degree to which two variables' movements are associated statistically but not necessarily causally. The Pearson product-moment coefficient (r) ranges in value from a minimum of -1.000 (signifying a perfect negative relationship) to a maximum of 1.000 (signifying a perfect positive relationship). A coefficient of 0.000 indicates no statistical relationship. N signifies the number of cases in the calculation.¹

¹For more complete descriptions and illustrations, see Hubert M. Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965); Hayward Alker, *Mathematics and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1979); and R. Mark Sirkin, *Statistics for the Social Sciences* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005).

The Ikhwan used their pivotal position to maximum advantage in playing off Nur against secular rivals. Where FJP candidates were strong, they went head-to-head against Nur and everyone else. Where they were weak and Nur was strong, they joined forces with secular parties to undercut Nur. And when both Muslim parties were weak, they worked out a division of labor by running in separate districts so that they could pool pro-Muslim voters in tight races.

The conflicts between liberal and radical Muslims were matched by equally sharp divisions among secular parties with rival social and economic interests (Figure 1). The Egyptian Block's more urban and Christian supporters were worlds apart from the Wafd's more rural and Muslim followers. Wafd leaders could not make up their minds about which alliances they wanted to pursue. They flirted with the Ikhwan and then abandoned them. They resented the new money and quick success of the Egyptian Block while fuming over the Coptic Church's open appeal for Christians to support their own party instead of falling in line behind the well-worn Wafdist slogans of sectarian harmony and national unity. In the end, Wafdist candidates cut deals in all directions depending on their needs in each district. Their penchant for teaming up with former Mubarak loyalists usually backfired, leaving the Wafd's already squabbling factions even more reasons to blame one another for their collective failures.²

Figure 1
Tacit Alliance of Islamic and Secular Liberals versus Salafis and NDP Remnants



Key: Arrows indicate the most important correlations between votes for the major parties. Numbers indicate the strength of relationships measured by Pearson's *r*.


²Abdel-Rahman Hussein, "After Crushing Defeat, Wafd Wonders What's Next," *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, 8 December 2011; *Al Masry Al Youm*, "Al-Wafd yurad ala al-Kutla: Hasalna ala 15 maqa id wa haqaqtum 8 faqat" (The Wafd Responds to the Egyptian Block: We Won Fifteen Seats and You Got Only Eight), 19 December 2011c.

KEY MATCH-UPS BETWEEN PARTIES IN LOCAL DISTRICTS

A third of parliament – 166 members – was elected from small local districts where candidates needed to win a majority of all votes cast. In all but a handful of cases, this required two rounds of polling in which the two largest vote getters from the first round faced one another in a decisive run-off election. Sore losers had ample opportunity to get even by ganging up against front-runners and rival insurgents frequently joined forces to defeat local big wigs. Many run-offs were decided by razor-thin margins and turnout rates were always lower than in the first round of voting. Under these conditions, party leaders could trade support in several contests at once, particularly in the same district and governorate. Party loyalists quickly got the message and responded by shifting their second round votes to tip the balance in the preferred direction.

Three groups dominated these winner-take-all races (Figure 2). More than 40 percent of the contests pitted the FJP against Nur and another 19 percent paired the FJP with NDP successors. The remaining battles involved the FJP or Nur and a secular party. Only four percent of the elections were decided between finalists who were neither FJP nor Nur candidates.

Figure 2
Party Match-ups in Contests for Individual Seats



The Ikhwan feasted on these races. They won 80 percent of the individual seat elections that they contested, divided evenly between victories over Nur and over the secular parties (Figure 3). FJP candidates defeated Nur rivals in three-fourths of their confrontations and they were even more successful against opponents from the Egyptian Block and the NDP successor groups. The Ikhwan was the only group that performed more effectively in single-district races that required absolute majorities than in

the party list contests in which seats were shared according to proportional representation. In the elected Egyptian Parliament, the FJP accounted for about 47 percent of all members, but it controlled 66 percent of the winner-take-all seats compared to less than 40 percent of the party list seats.

Nur also had reason to celebrate after its stunning successes in local races in every part of the country. Nur won over two-thirds of the contests it entered against all of the secular parties. Even when the Ikhwan defeated Nur, it was often in a photo finish in which all other parties ganged up to push back a first-round surge by the Salafis (Figure 4). Nearly one half of the FJP-Nur battles were decided by margins of ten percent or less – an extraordinary achievement in view of the clear mismatch between the two parties’ organizational resources and political experience (Figure 5). Nur leaders came away from the district elections knowing that they had connected with marginalized voters everywhere and confident that they were breathing down the Ikhwan’s neck.

Figure 3
FJP and Nur Success Rates in Contests for Individual District Seats




Figure 4
FJP Margins of Victory in Face-offs with Nur for 70 Individual District Seats





Figure 5
Margins of Victory in FJP and Nur Competition for 70 Individual District Seats



FOUR ARENAS OF SOCIAL STRUGGLE – CLASS AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN URBAN AND RURAL DISTRICTS

While the Ikhwan and Nur competed for pro-Muslim support, the Wafd and the Egyptian Block battled for third place by appealing to more secular-minded voters. The Ikhwan-Nur rivalry and the Wafd-Egyptian Block quarrels were the two most dominant partisan cleavages in the nation as a whole. Viewing voter alignments along these two overriding dimensions, we can see the relative strength of each party in different regions and among various demographic groups. Figure 6 plots margins of victory in FJP versus Nur contests against margins of victory in Wafd versus Egyptian Block races in the 46 party list districts, classifying districts into four regional groupings – the big cities (Cairo, Giza, and Alexandria), the Nile Delta, Upper Egypt, and the Canal Zone and border areas.

The Ikhwan and Nur competed in rallying Muslim farmers and wage-earners against the provincial elites (*ayan*) led by the Wafd and its NDP allies.³ Nur focused on poorer farmers and agricultural workers while the Ikhwan appealed to small farmers who worked their own lands and to the struggling middle classes in the provincial towns and capitals. At the same time, the Ikhwan and Nur also coordinated battles against Egyptian Block efforts to mobilize Christian voters. In these races, the Ikhwan keyed on the big cities while Nur concentrated on rural and small town districts.


For example, in the party list contests of the Nile Delta (green circles), the districts cluster in two zones of conflict – struggles between local notables and middle income townsmen (the top right quadrant) and battles between local notables and lower class rural groups (the top left quadrant). The FJP led the challenge against the *ayan* in the more urban districts of the Delta whereas Nur carried the battle in the more rural areas. In contrast, districts in the big cities (red circles) cluster in zones of conflict between Muslims and Christians (the lower right quadrant). The FJP surpassed Nur in all of these districts, but Nur performed much better in Giza and Alexandria than in Cairo.

Class tensions and religious tensions encouraged different patterns of partisan conflict. When economic and class divisions were salient, the Ikhwan and Nur mobilized separate sources of social discontent – with more urban and middle income groups favoring the Ikhwan and with rural and marginalized voters supporting Nur. When Christian-Muslim tensions were salient, Nur spearheaded pro-Muslim sentiments in the countryside whereas the Ikhwan took the lead in the big cities and provincial capitals.

³ Leonard Binder, *In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

On the class front, the main targets of the Ikhwan and Nur were fellow Muslims who benefited most from the old regime – Wafdist landlords and their NDP partners. On the religious front, the chief opponent was the nexus of Coptic churchmen and Egyptian Block entrepreneurs that sought to represent Christians of all classes in both the cities and the countryside.

Figure 6
Class and Religious Conflicts in Urban and Rural Districts
(Margins of victory in FJP v Nur contests and in Wafd v Egyptian Block contests)



Muslim voters were deeply divided by class and economic interests whereas Christians were more inclined to rally around the banner of religious solidarity. Muslims split between three parties that represented not only rival religious views but also competing class coalitions – the privileged notables of the Wafd, the middle class moderates of the Ikhwan, and the fire-eating Salafis who claimed to speak for the voiceless. Christian voters, on the other hand, were more receptive to religious appeals, sensing a unique opportunity to establish a separate political base and facing stronger pressures from radical Muslim candidates. By supporting a single new party despite their profound social and regional differences, Christian voters were

effectively declaring political independence from the Muslim-dominated parties – both liberal and authoritarian – that had claimed to speak on their behalf for over a century.⁴

NUR ROCKS THE WORLD

Although the Ikhwan won the elections, it was Nur that stole the spotlight. Nur's achievement was impressive not merely because of the sheer number of votes and seats it amassed, but because more than any party it tapped the power of the poor and the hopeless. Before the elections, the conventional wisdom portrayed Nur as little more than a cult of religious fanatics who were out of touch with the modern world.⁵ After the elections, it was clear that Nur had spearheaded a movement of social protest that no other party dared to embrace.

The social and geographic profile of Nur's support reflects inequality and injustice far more than religion. The party's power is firmly anchored in the poorest backwaters of the Nile Delta and the slums of Alexandria. When we follow the trails of Nur's appeal, we discover the bitter tastes and smells of misery in a thousand wretched neighborhoods and villages. Tropical fever, polluted drinking water, infected livestock, salinized land, radioactive irrigation canals, downstream farms of rock and sand, migrant slums, and farm workers on reclaimed desert land – these are the hallmarks of Nur bastions all along the Mediterranean coast from Alexandria's western suburbs to Port Sa id. In Baheira, Kafr al-Sheikh, Damietta, Daqhaliya, Sharqiya, and Qalubiya, Nur followers were consistently concentrated in the poorest lands, the driest irrigation sites, the most diseased households, and the biggest pools of agricultural wage labor.⁶

⁴ Maggie Michael, "Christians Under Siege in Post-revolution Egypt," *Associated Press*, 11 October 2011.

⁵ Ashraf el-Sherif, "Islamism after the Arab Spring," *Current History*, December 2011.

⁶ Tarek H.S. Kotb et al., "Soil Salinization in the Nile Delta and Related Policy Issues in Egypt," *Agricultural Water Management*, Vol. 43 (2000): 239-261; Mohamed H. Geriesh et al., "Problems of Drinking Water Treatment Along Ismailia Canal Province, Egypt," *Journal of Zhejiang University Science*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (March 2008): 232-242; W.E.Y. Abdel Malik et al., "Radiological Review Studies on Ismailiya Canal Ecology," Tenth Radiation Physics and Protection Conference, Nasr City-Cairo, Egypt, 27-30 November 2010, 211-230; Yamen M. Hegazy et al., "Ruminant Brucellosis in the Kafr El Sheikh Governorate of the Nile Delta, Egypt: Prevalence of a Neglected Zoonosis," *Public Library of Science: Neglected Tropical Diseases*, January 2011.

PARTITIONING KAFR AL-SHEIKH

Nur's early breakthroughs jolted the other parties into action. Within a matter of days, they were forming alliances and counter alliances to push back the surprising surges of populism that sprang up in one district after another. In the lower Delta province of Kafr al-Sheikh, they closed ranks to draw the lines against Nur both politically and geographically. In the first round of polling, Nur and the Ikhwan had won eight of the 12 seats (four each) in Kafr al-Sheikh's party list districts. At the same time, Nur candidates finished first in four of the six races for individual seats and, heading into the run-off elections, they seemed poised to form the biggest block in Kafr al-Sheikh's 18-member parliamentary delegation. At the eleventh hour, local Wafd leaders stepped in to broker a multiparty power-sharing agreement that blocked the looming Nur majority with a three-way partition of the entire province.

The Wafdist pact amounted to a social-political armistice that tried to hand each party a separate demographic and geographic constituency. Nur kept only two of the four seats it won in the first round – both in the poorest and most disease-ridden southern villages surrounding the town of Kafr al-Sheikh. The Wafd and former NDP candidates controlled the city of Dasuq and its fertile hinterland along the Rosetta branch of the Nile – the original homeland of Sa ad Zaghlul, the founder of the Wafd and the iconic leader of Egypt's first nationalist revolution in 1919.




Map 2 (Kafr al-Sheikh): Egypt Travel Search

The FJP was both a beneficiary and a target of this arrangement. The FJP picked up the two seats that Nur was expected to win in Hamul district, a mixed region of villages and small towns in the northern and eastern parts of the province. In exchange, the FJP lost a seat in the city of Dasuq where their candidate had enjoyed a comfortable lead in the first round. The Wafdist landlord, Muhammad Abd al- Alim Dawud, won easily, piling up the largest margin in the governorate with 70 percent of the vote. Dawud’s coattails helped his urban ally and NDP successor, Yusuf al-Badri Abd al-Fattah, to squeak past the Ikhwan’s Muhammad Ali al-Hilisi, who had won nearly twice as many votes as Abd al-Fattah just two weeks earlier.

When the dust cleared, the final tally was: Nur 2, Ikhwan 2, Wafd-NDP successors 2, with each block entrenched in neighboring districts and separate social strata. The Wafd helped the NDP remnants drive the Ikhwan from Dasuq, and all three parties joined to push Nur out of Hamul. The Wafd orchestrated the bargaining and the Ikhwan was the pivot, agreeing to concede the city to the old guard in exchange for help in rolling back Nur’s gains in the countryside (Figure 7 and Table 2).

Figure 7
Power-sharing and Partition in Kafr al-Sheikh
Table 2



**Kafr al-Sheikh – Votes for Professional and Worker-Farmer Seats
(Number of votes and percent of total votes cast)**

District and type of seat	Round one				Run-offs			
	Nur	FJP	Wafd	NDPs	Nur	FJP	Wafd	NDPs
Kafr al-Sheikh pro w-f	140,447 103,664	49,844 54,634			186,126 215,126	143,613 114,613		
Hamul pro w-f	67,739 54,136	49,079 31,237			92,619 100,581	116,220 108,258		
Dasuq pro w-f		65,792 44,387	128,448	39,885		108,866 65,662	153,572	110,368
Kafr al-Sheikh pro w-f	34.43 25.41	12.22 13.39			56.45 64.24	43.55 34.76		
Hamul pro w-f	17.02 23.49	10.83 18.77			44.35 48.16	55.65 51.84		
Dasuq pro w-f		22.38 15.10	43.70	13.57		49.66 29.95	70.05	50.34
Professional Seats	(2)	(1)	(0)	(0)	1	1	0	1
Worker-Farmer Seats	(2)	(0)	(1)	(0)	1	1	1	0

(**Bold** = Run-off winners; **Italics** = Run-off winners who finished in second place in round one)

In the nearby province of Damietta, the Wafd-Ikhwan backlash against Nur was even more effective. During the first round, Nur had won the party list vote while seizing the lead in three of the four individual district contests. In the end, Nur came away with no individual seats at all because its rivals pooled forces to defeat it by the slimmest of margins – no more than one or two percentage points – in every race (Table 3). The same pattern appeared throughout the Nile Delta governorates, with the Ikhwan and Wafd teaming up to snatch away one or two seats at a time from Nur front-runners in Alexandria, Baheira, Gharbiya, Minufiya, and Sharqiya.

Table 3
Damietta – Votes for Professional and Worker-Farmer Seats
(Number of votes and percent of total votes cast)

District and type of seat	Round one			Run-offs		
	Nur	FJP	Wafd	Nur	FJP	Wafd
Damietta pro w-f	50,796 89,947	125,734 84,062		57,275 93,010	135,587 99,852	
Kafr Sa d pro w-f	65,694 65,165	49,437	51,018	101,689 99,734	104,052	106,007
Damietta pro w-f	19.38 34.32	47.97 32.07		29.70 48.23	70.30 51.77	
Kafr Sa d pro w-f	23.20 23.02	17.46	18.02	49.43 48.48	50.57	51.52
Professional Seats	(1)	(1)	(0)	0	2	0
Worker-Farmer Seats	(2)	(0)	(0)	0	1	1

(**Bold** = Run-off winners; **Italics** = Run-off winners who finished in second place in round one)

CRUSHING THE LANDLORDS

On the farmlands at the edges of the Nile Delta, the Ikhwan and Nur were unstoppable. In Baheira, west of the Rosetta branch, Nur finished first in both party list districts. In the run-off round, the Ikhwan regrouped and joined Nur in sweeping the contests for individual seats – seven going to the FJP and three to Nur. In Sharqiya, east of the Damietta branch, the Ikhwan won all ten district seats against a list of Mubarak-era holdovers cobbled together by Wafdist landlords. Wafdist power brokers in Sharqiya made a colossal blunder by insisting on going head-to-head against both of the Muslim parties. Their humiliation helped to spark a long series of postelection revolts against the Wafd's aged and stumbling national leaders.⁷

⁷Heba Afify, "In Sharqiya, Islamists are Poised to Sweep Seats," *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, 14 December 2011.

The Baheira contest looked like a replay of Kafr al-Sheikh except that, this time, the landlords were too weak and disorganized to act as spoilers. In each of Baheira's districts, Ikhwan and Nur strength followed familiar demographic fault lines. The FJP won the city of Damanhur in the north and the middle-sized farms along the Nile to the east. Nur carried the poorer farmers of the interior and the agricultural workers on reclaimed semi-desert lands in the west and south. The intermediate zones – the secondary city of Kafr al-Dawar and the surrounding countryside – swayed back and forth between the first round and the run-offs, with neither party winning by more than three or four percentage points.

In Sharqiya, Nur was a bit player in the showdown between the Ikhwan and the landlords, but the contest's political geography was typical of the Delta as a whole. The FJP dominated the city of Zagazig and the small farmers on fertile lands to the north. Nur did best in the south, around the big estates of Bilbeis and in the struggling downstream villages that depend on the contaminated waters of the Isma iliya irrigation canal. Ironically, it was precisely in this location – on the Bilbeis estate of the head of the Wafd's "southern faction" in Sharqiya – that the landlords had caucused to endorse the Mubarak era holdovers that the Ikhwan mowed down just two weeks later.⁸

FAYYUM AND ITS MULTIPLE DISCONTENTS

In Fayyum, the Ikhwan and Nur quickly mobilized a complex set of social grievances and local rivalries that seemed tailor-made for their strategies. At first, it appeared that the Ikhwan had simply scored another grand slam in Fayyum by winning the party list votes and then sweeping all six of the individual seats. In fact, Nur found deep pockets of support, putting it in striking distance of victory in several races and carving out a firm niche for the future.

Fayyum's politics revolve around the unequal distribution of water and voting power. Recurring drought has put enormous pressure on its compact population and delicate ecology. The city has always been underrepresented and outvoted by farmers whose livelihood depends on diverting the Nile tributary for irrigation. As those waters dwindle, the persistent cleavage between town and country is overshadowed by still fiercer battles between competing groups of farmers, particularly the richer southern growers versus the poorer northerners near the polluted lake that collects most of the drainage from the rest of the province.⁹ Even the luckier landholders

⁸ *Al-Masry al-Youm*, "Ba d sa ta min i ilan da am lil-Musilhi: al-Wafd yutifiq ma 3 min murashshahi al-i ada" (Hours After Announcing Support for al-Musilhi, the Wafd Allies with Three Run-off Candidates), 19 December 2011b.

⁹ Shahira Amin, "Egypt's Farmers Desperate for Clean Water," CNN, 10 November 2010.

closer to the headwaters are feuding more than ever because upstream farmers are stealing water more frequently from their downstream neighbors.¹⁰ The result is an increasingly fractured and desperate electorate in which political entrepreneurs enjoy multiple avenues of entry.




Map 3 (Fayyum):
Egypt Program Support Unit,
Canadian International Development

As usual, Ikhwan candidates tapped into the frustration of the urban middle class while Nur thrived in the backward rural areas where land and water quality were poorest and deteriorating most rapidly (Figure 8). The distinctive feature of Fayyum's politics was the sharp polarization within the ranks of the prosperous southern farmers who had traditionally ruled the roost and who differed little from one another except in terms of who was better positioned to jerry-rig the irrigation canals in their favor. Nur polled almost as well in these wealthy but parched southern districts as it did in the down-and-out northern villages – a departure from its usual lower class roots and a clear contradiction of the assumption that its appeal stems from religious extremism instead of economic interest.

¹⁰W. Wolters et al., "Division of Irrigation Water in the Fayoum, Egypt," *Irrigation and Drainage Systems*, Vol. 1 (1987): 159-172 and "Managing the Water Balance of the Fayoum Depression, Egypt," *Irrigation and Drainage Systems*, Vol. 3 (1989): 103-123; Katharina Natter, "The Failures of Egyptian Agricultural Policy," *Daily News* (Egypt), 20 June 2010.

Figure 8
The Ecological and Social Bases of Political Conflict in Fayyum



RELIGIOUS CLASHES IN TOWN AND COUNTRY

Whereas class cleavages dominated the Delta, religious tensions were rawest in the big cities and in the southern districts of Upper Egypt. When pro-Christian candidates entered the field, the Ikhwan and Nur generally ran in separate races instead of competing against one another. This tactic was devastating for the Egyptian Block, which held its own in the party list battles only to lose 16 of the 18 individual seat races when they faced a pro-Muslim party.

In Cairo, the Ikhwan's home turf was never in doubt. Its strongholds are centered in the historic neighborhoods of "Islamic Cairo" – Gamaliya, Khalifa, and Hadayiq al-Quba – and stretch northward to include Zeitun, Ain Shams, and Shubra and southward through Abdin and Sayida Zeynab. The Ikhwan nucleus is the heart of pre-colonial Cairo – solid residential quarters dominated by mixed income households surrounding the busy market and mosque-filled passages that every foreign tourist remembers no matter how brief the visit. The adjacent quarters feature mainly British-era

construction where Christians and migrants comprise sizeable minorities.¹¹ In these parts of central Cairo, the Egyptian Block made it to the run-offs in seven contests and then lost by large margins in all but one – a seat in Qasr al-Nil’s commercial district in which it won with a bare majority. In Cairo, the Ikhwan’s stiffest competition appeared in the newer and more distant semi-suburban areas of Misr al-Gadida, Madinat Nasr, and Ma adi, where educated middle-class voters shied away from all of the parties and chose four independent candidates instead.



Map 4 (City of Cairo): EDAR

In Giza and Alexandria, Nur’s strength rose dramatically at the expense of both the Ikhwan and the Egyptian Block, especially in neighborhoods with high proportions of rural migrants (Table 4). Ikhwan leaders later admitted that they had been complacent in Alexandria because of their party’s strong showings there during Mubarak’s rule. In Giza as well, the Ikhwan were caught off guard by Nur’s obvious preparation and popularity.

¹¹ David Sims, “Urban Slums Report: The Case of Cairo, Egypt,” *UN-Habitat Global Report on Human Settlements*, 2003, 195-228.

Table 4
Percent Party List Votes by District – Cities

District – number of seats	FJP	Nur	Eg. Block	Wafd	Wasat	Thawra	Top 6 parties
[Cairo1 – 10 annulled]	[39.45]	[15.36]	[23.50]	[6.23]	[3.37]	[2.66]	[90.57]
Cairo1 – 10 revote	40.49	15.41	28.47	0.00	2.38	0.00	86.75
Cairo2 – 8	35.65	11.31	26.22	5.76	7.22	4.18	90.34
Cairo3 – 8	39.94	14.52	18.33	14.67	2.93	3.45	93.83
Cairo4 – 10	40.48	19.35	13.14	7.32	3.39	3.62	87.30
Giza1 – 10	41.09	29.10	10.52	7.80	5.75	0.00	94.25
Giza2 – 10	37.83	28.12	10.05	4.60	6.04	2.77	89.43
Alexandria1 – 10	34.41	29.85	16.02	6.40	3.27	4.11	94.06
Alexandria2 – 10	35.32	32.96	6.15	5.55	1.73	10.04	91.75
Total – 76	37.96	24.68	14.13	6.38	4.42	3.60	91.16

Battles for the individual seats in Alexandria and Giza were among the closest and most bitter in the nation. Nur won no individual seats in Giza, but it ran well in the outlying districts of Waraq to the north and around the Pyramids to the west. Nur also pressed Ikhwan candidates along the Nile bank in southern Giza where Christian-Muslim violence has flared up many times in recent years. In Alexandria, the Ikhwan barely held the central districts of Muharram Beg and Raml, while Nur took the poor southern suburbs of Mina al-Basal by similarly narrow margins. In the northern neighborhood of Montaza, the Ikhwan allied with liberals and Christians to defeat Nur's front-runner from the first round – a particularly menacing shaykh, Abdel Monem al-Shahat, who was calling democracy a form of atheism and claiming that the works of Naghib Mahfuz spread debauchery and prostitution.¹² At the same time, however, Nur joined all of the liberal parties in unseating a long-time NDP leader with an Ikhwan-backed judge, Mahmud al-Khudairi, who advocated a "Turkish-style" coalition government of moderate Muslims and secular democrats.¹³

¹² Tamim Elyan and Tom Heneghan, "Egyptian Voters Reject Salafi Hardliner in Run-off," *Reuters*, 7 December 2011; Sherif Tarek, "Liberals and Democrats Revel in Salafist Electoral Defeats," *Ahramonline*, 7 December 2011.

¹³ Hatem Maher and Sherif Tarek, "Reformist Judge, New MP Mahmoud El-Khodeiry on Islamist Ascendancy, Palestine," *Ahramonline*, 15 December 2011.

In Upper Egypt, Ikhwan-Nur competition gradually gave way to an explicit division of labor as they confronted the growing strength of Christians and of local landlords and tribal leaders who had been part of the NDP. Collaboration took two forms. Sometimes they divided an entire governorate into geographic spheres of influence. Even when the Ikhwan and Nur faced off against each other, the towns usually favored the Ikhwan whereas the villages supported Nur, so that the voters sorted themselves out along clear geographic lines. In other cases, the Ikhwan and Nur leaders took matters into their own hands. Instead of partitioning a whole province, they divided up the local districts by contesting only one seat in each constituency and conceding the second seat to the other pro-Muslim party. In this manner, they took turns in rallying Muslim majorities against pro-Christian candidates of the Egyptian Block and against the feudal notables left over from Mubarak's days.

This division of labor strategy gained momentum as the two parties carried their campaigns southward to the Upper Nile Valley. Direct competition was greatest in Fayyum – as chronicled above – and Beni Sueif, and much more muted in Minya and Assyut. Minya split neatly into equal northern and southern zones – the Ikhwan winning the more urban districts of Minya and Beni Mazar and Nur taking the more rural and Christian ones of

Markaz Minya, Abu Qirgas, and Malawi (Table 5).¹⁴ In Assyut, they blended competition and cooperation district by district. In the provincial capital, the Ikhwan stood aside so that Nur could defeat the NDP holdover while the Ikhwan's own candidate trounced the Egyptian Block. In the outlying areas of Assyut, Nur and Ikhwan leaders clashed over just one seat per district, leaving the Ikhwan free to dispatch pro-Christian and NDP opponents in races for the second seats.¹⁵

¹⁴ Abdel Rahman Youssef, "Copts, Islamists Face Off in Minya Run-offs," *Daily News* (Egypt), 11 January 2012; Ashraf Kamal, "I ilan nata ij al-maqa id al-fardiya bil-Minya" (Announcement of the Results for Individual Seats in Minya), *Al-Wafd*, 11 January 2012; Hujaj al-Husaini, "Al-Hurriya wa al- Adala wa al-Nur yatakasaman 8 maqa id lil-fardi bil-Minya" (Freedom and Justice and Nur Divide Eight Individual Seats in Minya), *Al-Ahram*, 14 January 2012.

¹⁵ Islam Radwan, "Copts and the Salafis in Asyut: 'One Hand'?" *Egyptvotes.org*, 19 December 2011 and "Bakr wa Abd ul-Jawad wa Musa wa Qarshi fil-i ada bil-da ira al-thalatha fi Assyut" (Bakr, Abd al-Jawad, Musa, and Qarshi in the Run-offs in Assyut's Third District), *Al-Ahram*, 14 January 2012a and "Fawz Khalaf bil-fi at wa i ada bayn Sadiq wa Abd al-Nasr ala al- umal fil-da ira Assyut" (Victory of Khalaf in the Professional Seat and Run-off of Sadiq and Abd al-Nasr for the Worker Seat in Assyut District), *Al-Ahram*, 14 January 2012b.

Table 5
Minya – Votes for Professional and Worker-Farmer Seats
(Percent of total votes cast)

District and type of seat	Round one				Run-offs			
	FJP	Nur	Eg. Block	NDPs	FJP	Nur	Eg. Block	NDPs
Minya pro w-f	15.33 9.19			9.39 4.48	63.71 57.47			36.29 42.53
Beni Mazar pro w-f	17.06 13.11	5.09 6.24			71.95 70.51	28.05 29.49		
Markaz Minya, Abu Qirgas pro w-f	5.75	9.69 7.15	6.04		43.48	56.52 76.67	23.33	
Malawi pro w-f		9.56 11.60		8.24 9.67		58.50 63.09		41.50 36.91
Professional Seats	(2)	(2)	(0)	(0)	2	2	0	0
Worker-Farmer Seats	(2)	(2)	(0)	(0)	2	2	0	0

In Sohag and Qena, district level collaboration reached its peak. Ikhwan and Nur candidates did not run against one another in a single race in these governorates. Together they won 13 out of 16 seats – seven for the Ikhwan and six for Nur – leaving rival *ayan* and independents to fight for the rest (Tables 6 and 7). Voters in Qena were so furious over *ayan* manipulation of the elections in Naga Hamadi that they blocked the railroad connections to Cairo for several days until the courts agreed to order a new round of polling that barred the previous front-runner.¹⁶ In both governorates,

¹⁶Mahmud al-Dasuqi, “Al-i ada bayn al-Ghul wa Qandil bi Qena wa al-Jama a al-Islamiya wa al-Hurriya wa al- Adala yu aradan” (Run-off between al-Ghul and Qandil in Qena; the Islamic Society and Freedom and Justice Object), *Al-Ahram*, 11 January 2012a and “Baltajiya yamna un ahali qariya Abu Shusha bi Qena min al-khuruj lil-taswit” (Thugs Prevent the Villagers of Abu Susha in Qena from Going Out to Vote), *Al-Ahram*, 15 January 2012b and “Amin al-Hurriya wa al- Adala bi Naga Hamadi: al-Salafiyun ankaru tahalufihum ma Abdalrahim al-Ghul” (The Leader of Freedom and Justice in Naga Hamadi: The Salafis Deny Allying with Abdalrahim al-Ghul), *Al-Ahram*, 15 January 2012c.

pro-Muslim candidates benefited from growing divisions among Christians who debated the wisdom of politicizing the churches and from an upsurge in village revolts against old tribal leaders who had continued to oppose the revolution right up to the election.¹⁷

In Sohag, Nur placed first in both party list districts. In the run-off elections, the FJP and Nur won eight of the ten individual seats even though Egyptian Block and NDP candidates had led the first round polling in all but one of the races. Such upsets occurred in several governorates, but usually in just a few races out of many. Only in Sohag and Damietta were second round reversals the rule instead of the exception.

Table 6
Sohag – Votes for Professional and Worker-Farmer Seats
(Percent of total votes cast)

District and type of seat	Round one					Run-offs				
	FJP	Nur	EB	NDPs	Ind.	FJP	Nur	EB	NDPs	Ind.
Sohag, Akhmim pro w-f	13.21	12.08	15.49	15.85		66.44	69.01	30.99	33.56	
Maghagha pro w-f	11.43	12.46		14.49	11.78	55.63	53.26		46.74	44.37
Tahta, Tama pro w-f	20.69	19.47	20.82		9.34	59.97	60.86	40.03		39.14
Girga, Mansha pro w-f		24.77		19.76 24.92	18.33		61.13		38.87 45.58	54.42
Balyana pro w-f	16.63			23.51 31.79	11.71	53.00			47.00 52.86	47.14
Professional Seats	(0)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(1)	4	1	0	0	0
Pro Seats W-F Seats	(0)	(1)	(1)	(3)	(0)	0	3	0	1	1

(**Bold** = Run-off winners; *Italics* = Run-off winners who finished in second place in round one)

¹⁷ Samia Serageldin, "The Dead Pope Rises: Coptic Conundrum in Egypt," *Salon.com*, 20 March 2012; Sherry el-Gergawi, "Egyptian Copts Call for 'Brotherhood' of Their Own," *Ahram Weekly*, 31 March 2012.

Table 7
Qena – Votes for Professional and Worker-Farmer Seats
(Percent of total votes cast)

District and type of seat	Round one			Run-offs		
	FJP	Nur	NDPs	FJP	Nur	NDPs
Qena, Qaft pro w-f	21.44	6.70	3.20 3.90	76.97	68.88	23.03 31.12
Naga Hamadi, Qus, Naqada pro w-f	18.85	3.31	3.14 5.28	70.50	41.45	58.55 29.50
Abu Tisht, Dashna, Farshawt pro w-f		7.93	7.21 [4.13/6.75]	58.57	62.42	41.43 37.58
Professional Seats	(1)	(2)	(0)	2	0	1
Worker-Farmer Seats	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	2	0

([Brackets]) = Annulled by court order; **Bold** = Run-off winners; *Italics* = Run-off winners who finished in second place in round one)

In Luxor and Aswan – the most urbanized regions of Upper Egypt – semi-competitiveness reemerged. In each case, Ikhwan candidates had to battle Nur for one seat and a secular party for the other – this time the Wafd instead of the Egyptian Block and NDP successors. In the end, the Ikhwan took both seats in Luxor and lost both seats in Aswan.

Ikhwan and Nur leaders showed great pragmatism and flexibility in adapting to the variegated landscape of religious animosity and feudal power in Upper Egypt. Neither party was at home in this territory – not the urban middle-class Ikhwan and certainly not the northern-based Salafis who thrived along the salty rim of the Mediterranean coast and in the big city slums. Precisely because both parties were aware of their weakness in the Sa'id, they used greater caution and modesty in planning their campaigns and making the most of meager resources.

The FJP's edge in the southern towns was largely due to the Ikhwan's tireless work in organizing provincial-level professional syndicates and student groups throughout Egypt since the later years of the Sadat era.¹⁸ Nur had to rely more on local intermediaries, particularly the militant Islamic groups that were beginning to resurface after years of skirmishing with police forces all along the upper Nile and across the surrounding deserts. Although these were valuable bridgeheads, they were not yet the sort of reliable bases that national party organizations require. Those who believe that the Ikhwan and Nur enjoyed an unfair advantage in these elections because Mubarak tolerated them more than other opponents and because Persian Gulf Arabs fattened them with funds might reconsider their views if they look more closely at the planning and compromise these parties displayed in nearly every race and district that they contested.¹⁹

The elections were a learning experience for all of the parties and their supporters in deciding when to compromise and when to fight and in choosing the most appropriate allies in rapidly changing circumstances. These are the same skills that Egypt's new democratic leaders will have to sharpen on a daily basis as they tackle the endless backlog of problems that have accumulated for at least a generation. Whether drafting a constitution or forming coalition governments or haggling over economic and social policy, no party will be able to impose its preferences and every group will have to live with compromises they deplore. Mindful of the military's consuming ambition and the old regime's thirst for revenge, Egypt's democrats have good reason to fear their common enemies far more than they fear one another. That awareness – along with the bargaining skills developed in three months of electoral battle – can help the democratic revolution survive the certain storms ahead, but only if both the winning and losing sides have the wisdom to keep trading votes and sharing power.

The Muslim Brothers are forced by circumstance to embrace the thankless task of straddling the chasm between Nur and the secular parties. This will create a dizzying parade of ad hoc alliances and ugly compromises on critical issues that Egyptians are likely to be debating for at least a decade – presidential contests, civilian control of the military, the separation of powers, the role of the private sector and foreign investment, relations with the United States and Israel, and countless efforts to expand and roll back the rights of women and Christians.

¹⁸ Robert R. Bianchi, *Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

¹⁹ Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Ikhwan wa Qatariyun...wa Salafiyun wa Sa udiyun" (The Ikhwan and the Qataris; the Salafis and the Saudis), *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, 17 December 2011.

The Ikhwan has no choice but to be democratic because it is a pluralist coalition trying to lead a tumultuous and cosmopolitan society. The Ikhwan is too small to monopolize power and too big to suppress its inner conflicts. Knowing it cannot rule alone, it seeks a new set of allies for every issue, and every alliance with outsiders heightens disagreements between its own factions over the proper course of the party, the movement, and the country. Extremism of any sort will tear the Ikhwan apart long before it can tear Egypt apart. Its leaders will have to govern the same way that they campaigned – from the center and with hands outstretched in many directions at once.

APPENDIX A

THE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES

Freedom and Justice Party

Founded by the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun) and well-connected to professional and community associations in the provincial capitals and towns.

Nur

Led by Islamic preachers with diverse religious and political views who claim to represent the poorest and most marginalized peasants and urban migrants, particularly in the Nile Delta.

Wafd

The successor of the nationalist movement that led the 1919 Revolution and struggled to build parliamentary democracy in the face of opposition from the monarchy and the British before the 1952 Revolution. Headed by old rural landholders with extensive urban interests in business and the professions.

Egyptian Block

A coalition of small parties funded by big business leaders and supported by many activists in the Coptic community who desire an independent Christian voice to counter Muslim political power.

Wasat

A small group of Muslim modernists who try to create a tolerant religious “center” between the Muslim Brotherhood and the major secular parties, particularly the Wafd and the Egyptian Block.

The Revolution Continues (Al-Thawra Mustamira)

The strongest new party to emerge from the Revolution of 2011 with many supporters in the largest cities and in a handful of provincial capitals.

National Democratic Party successors

Several small parties are popularly known as “remnants” of the Mubarak regime because most of their candidates served in executive or legislative posts under the authoritarian government. These include the National Party, the Reform and Development Party, the Egyptian Citizen Party, the Freedom Party, and the Union Party, as well as several self-described “independent” groups.

APPENDIX B

THE TIMELINE AND STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTIONS

Timeline

The elections occurred in three stages spread out over about two months. Each stage covered nine governorates.

Stage one

Governorates – Cairo, Alexandria, Port Sa id, Fayyum, Luxor, Damietta, Kafr al-Sheikh, Assyut, and the Red Sea

First round – November 28-29, 2011

Run-offs – December 5-6, 2011

Court-ordered revotes – January 10-11 and January 17-18, 2012

Stage two

Governorates – Giza, Beni Sueif, Minufiya, Sharqiya, Isma iliya, Suez, Baheira, Sohag, and Aswan

First round – December 14-15, 2011

Run-offs – December 21-22, 2011

Court-ordered revotes – January 14-15 and January 18-19, 2012



Stage three

Governorates – Qalubiyah, Gharbiyah, Daqhaliyah, Minyah, Qena, North Sinai, South Sinai, New Valley, and Matruh

First round – January 3-4, 2012

Run-offs – January 10-11, 2012

Court-ordered revotes – January 16-17, 2012 and January 18-19, 2012

Structure

Hybrid representation. Egypt's system of parliamentary representation combines three different methods of allocating seats – proportional representation, majority rule, and functional representation (also described as corporatism).

Proportional representation is the most important part of the formula. It applies for two-thirds of the deputies who are chosen from candidate lists prepared by party leaders. Each party wins a number of seats that corresponds to its share of the total vote.

Majority rule applies in the elections for individual seats at the local level. In each district, victory requires an absolute majority of the vote. Usually, no candidate achieves a majority in the first balloting so the top two vote getters must then compete in a separate run-off election at a later date. Functional representation is a symbolic vestige of the Arab Socialist era. The categories of "professional" and "worker-farmer" originally designated seats reserved for occupational groups, but in current practice these labels have little relevance and they are likely to be abolished in future electoral arrangements.

Party list districts. Two-thirds of the seats (332) were filled through proportional representation. Each party prepared a list of candidates and won a number of seats that closely reflected its percentage of the total vote in each of 46 districts. Every governorate contained between one and four party list districts depending on its population size.

Individual seat districts. One-third of the seats (166) were filled by first-past-the-post elections in which victory required a majority of all votes cast. If no candidate achieved an absolute majority, then the top two vote getters battled it out in a run-off election about two weeks after the initial voting. Candidates ran in 83 local districts that were usually subdivisions of the larger party list districts. Every district elected two representatives – one "professional" and one "worker-farmer." Every governorate contained between one and nine individual seat districts according to the size of its population.

Examples. Voters in Cairo elected a total of 54 deputies – 36 deputies from four party list districts and 18 deputies (nine professionals and nine workers-farmers) from nine individual seat districts. In Kafr al-Sheikh, voters elected a total of 18 deputies – 12 deputies from two party list districts and six deputies (three professionals and three workers-farmers) from three individual seat districts.

APPENDIX C

Party	Total votes	Percent votes	Total votes	Percent seats
FJP	10,138,134	36.40	127	38.25
Nur	7,534,266	27.05	96	28.92
Wafd	2,480,391	8.91	36	10.84
Egyptian Block	2,402,238	8.63	33	9.94
Wasat	989,004	3.55	10	3.01
Revolution Continues	745,863	2.68	7	2.11
Reform and Development	604,415	2.17	8	2.41
Freedom	514,029	1.85	4	1.20
National	425,021	1.53	4	1.20
Conservatives	272,910	0.98	0	0.00
Democratic Peace	248,281	0.89	1	0.30
Egyptian Citizen	235,395	0.85	3	0.90
Adl	184,553	0.66	0	0.00
Egyptian Arab Union	149,253	0.54	1	0.30
Union	141,382	0.51	2	0.60
21 other parties	785,935	2.82	0	0.00
Total	27,851,070	100.00	332	100.00

APPENDIX D PARTY LIST VOTES BY DISTRICT – CITIES

District – number of seats	FJP	Nur	Eg. Block	Wafd	Wasat	Thawra	Total
[Cairo1 – 10 annulled]	[426,938]	[166,195]	[254,339]	[67,416]	[36,429]	[28,782]	[1,082,142]
Cairo1 – 10 revote	158,254	60,219	111,288	0	9,303	0	390,838
Cairo2 – 8	312,229	99,032	229,624	50,437	63,275	36,597	875,785
Cairo3 – 8	163,235	59,342	74,897	59,942	11,962	14,080	408,692
Cairo4 – 10	455,623	217,750	147,880	82,399	38,132	40,712	1,125,467
Giza1 – 10	571,262	404,549	146,217	108,398	79,930	0	1,390,329
Giza2 – 10	546,974	406,543	145,346	66,528	87,368	40,077	1,445,699
Alexandria1 – 10	395,961	343,500	184,407	73,679	37,641	47,325	1,150,865
Alexandria2 – 10	357,990	334,051	62,305	56,259	17,579	101,711	1,013,473
Total – 76	2,961,528	1,924,986	1,101,964	497,642	345,190	280,502	7,801,148

PERCENT PARTY LIST VOTES BY DISTRICT – CITIES

District – number of seats	FJP	Nur	Eg. Block	Wafd	Wasat	Thawra	Top 6 parties
[Cairo1 – 10 annulled]	[39.45]	[15.36]	[23.50]	[6.23]	[3.37]	[2.66]	[90.57]
Cairo1 – 10 revote	40.49	15.41	28.47	0.00	2.38	0.00	86.75
Cairo2 – 8	35.65	11.31	26.22	5.76	7.22	4.18	90.34
Cairo3 – 8	39.94	14.52	18.33	14.67	2.93	3.45	93.83
Cairo4 – 10	40.48	19.35	13.14	7.32	3.39	3.62	87.30
Giza1 – 10	41.09	29.10	10.52	7.80	5.75	0.00	94.25
Giza2 – 10	37.83	28.12	10.05	4.60	6.04	2.77	89.43
Alexandria1 – 10	34.41	29.85	16.02	6.40	3.27	4.11	94.06
Alexandria2 – 10	35.32	32.96	6.15	5.55	1.73	10.04	91.75
Total – 76	37.96	24.68	14.13	6.38	4.42	3.60	91.16

PARTY LIST VOTES BY DISTRICT – NILE DELTA

District – number of seats	FJP	Nur	Eg. Block	Wafd	Wasat	Thawra	Total
Menoufia1 – 8	210,357	138,121	37,973	68,987	30,434	0	618,621
Menoufia2 – 8	269,038	109,600	0	174,463	17,287	11,280	686,587
Sharqiya1 – 10	432,693	302,376	76,067	119,904	25,430	22,948	1,138,924
Sharqiya2 – 10	425,680	249,119	45,680	167,101	36,045	10,803	1,197,875
Beheira1 – 12	477,121	534,913	58,586	117,417	0	29,023	1,336,877
Beheira2 – 8	198,394	208,743	11,926	48,726	11,172	7,451	572,436
Qalubiya1 – 4	188,641	123,497	26,315	57,972	32,828	15,898	528,921
Qalubia2 – 8	461,383	355,908	88,221	78,915	26,020	18,281	1,205,853
[Daqahliya1 – 8 annulled]	[259,004]	[229,084]	[22,325]	[97,454]	[12,935]	[103,888]	[851,245]
Daqahliya1 – 8 revote	162,025	123,492	6,783	44,205	5,608	74,801	487,581
Daqahliya2 – 8	241,350	180,795	13,062	73,580	8,598	54,662	623,303
[Daqahliya3 – 8 annulled]	[252,828]	[219,348]	[20,258]	[68,521]	[18,735]	[69,313]	[784,772]
Daqahliya3 – 8 revote	141,157	115,653	0	27,078	0	49,175	437,704
Gharbiya1 – 10	255,704	265,216	65,967	122,966	17,187	29,009	891,959
Gharbiya2 – 10	371,730	285,781	46,339	171,392	21,813	0	988,820
Damietta – 8	169,253	209,726	18,378	24,630	73,876	3,982	543,594
Kafr al-Sheikh1 – 8	212,064	276,654	0	86,466	11,896	0	710,870
Kafr al-Sheikh2 – 4	94,486	68,007	6,976	46,636	19,919	17,979	303,661
Total – 132	4,519,726	3,756,888	538,073	1,525,130	364,175	394,517	12,984,318

PERCENT PARTY LIST VOTES BY DISTRICT – NILE DELTA

District – number of seats	FJP	Nur	Eg. Block	Wafd	Wasat	Thawra	Total 6 parties
Menoufia1 – 8	34.00	22.33	6.14	11.15	4.92	0.00	78.54
Menoufia2 – 8	39.18	15.96	0.00	25.41	2.52	1.64	84.72
Sharqiya1 – 10	37.99	26.55	6.68	10.53	2.23	2.01	86.00
Sharqiya2 – 10	35.54	20.80	3.81	13.95	3.01	0.90	78.01
Beheira1 – 12	35.69	40.01	4.38	8.78	0.00	2.17	91.04
Beheira2 – 8	34.66	36.47	2.08	8.51	1.95	1.30	84.97
Qalubiya1 – 4	35.67	23.35	4.98	10.96	6.21	3.01	84.16
Qalubia2 – 8	38.26	29.52	7.32	6.54	2.16	1.52	85.31
[Daqahliya1 – 8 annulled]	[30.43]	[26.91]	[2.62]	[11.45]	[1.52]	[12.20]	[85.13]
Daqahliya1 – 8 revote	33.23	25.33	1.39	9.07	1.15	15.34	85.51
Daqahliya2 – 8	38.72	29.01	2.10	11.80	1.38	8.77	91.78
[Daqahliya3 – 8 annulled]	[32.22]	[27.95]	[2.58]	[8.73]	[2.39]	[8.83]	[82.70]
Daqahliya3 – 8 revote	32.25	26.42	0.00	6.19	0.00	11.23	76.09
Gharbiya1 – 10	28.67	29.73	7.40	13.79	1.93	3.25	84.76
Gharbiya2 – 10	37.59	28.90	4.69	17.33	2.21	0.00	90.72
Damietta – 8	31.14	38.58	3.38	4.53	13.59	0.73	91.95
Kafr al-Sheikh1 – 8	29.83	38.92	0.00	12.16	1.67	0.00	82.59
Kafr al-Sheikh2 – 4	31.12	22.40	2.30	15.36	6.56	5.92	83.65
Total – 132	34.81	28.93	4.14	11.75	2.80	3.04	85.48

PARTY LIST VOTES BY DISTRICT – UPPER EGYPT

District – number of seats	FJP	Nur	Eg. Block	Wafd	Wasat	Thawra	Total
Fayyum1 – 8	200,976	130,093	10,108	16,048	17,683	22,445	447,743
Fayyum2 – 4	131,153	116,534	16,321	0	4,630	0	291,143
Beni Sueif1 – 8	233,938	207,468	0	67,714	18,247	19,420	592,771
Beni Sueif2 – 4	135,073	100,168	31,059	23,599	0	0	312,858
Minya1 – 8	362,318	174,146	44,392	29,787	49,898	7,563	782,707
Minya2 – 8	243,346	191,074	133,246	45,435	27,943	0	680,235
Assiyut1 – 8	261,321	136,920	133,437	24,497	21,881	12,098	657,027
Assiyut2 – 8	128,072	102,082	71,520	14,027	6,224	0	393,188
Sohag1 – 12	222,672	229,829	125,083	36,448	21,785	9,660	783,535
[Sohag2 – 8 annulled]	[76,121]	[64,173]	[51,661]	[29,339]	[16,143]	[5,014]	[335,261]
Sohag2 – 8 revote	37,026	40,686	17,445	8,022	10,168	0	148,875
Qena1 – 4	114,822	77,006	0	31,351	8,460	10,022	352,003
Qena2 – 8	87,911	64,693	13,831	20,223	11,631	0	337,728
Luxor – 4	118,566	50,691	41,726	35,533	10,098	0	321,285
[Aswan – 4 annulled]	[148,369]	[104,079]	[40,621]	[34,246]	[12,369]	[10,209]	[439,084]
Aswan – 4 revote	60,235	48,238	15,992	18,442	0	5,015	171,117
Total – 96	2,337,429	1,669,628	654,160	371,126	208,648	86,223	6,272,215

PERCENT PARTY LIST VOTES BY DISTRICT – UPPER EGYPT

District – number of seats	FJP	Nur	Eg. Block	Wafd	Wasat	Thawra	Total 6 parties
Fayyum1 – 8	44.89	29.06	2.26	3.58	3.95	5.01	88.75
Fayyum2 – 4	45.05	40.03	5.61	0.00	1.59	0.00	92.27
Beni Sueif1 – 8	39.47	35.00	0.00	11.42	3.08	3.28	92.24
Beni Sueif2 – 4	43.17	32.02	9.93	7.54	0.00	0.00	92.66
Minya1 – 8	46.29	22.25	5.67	3.81	6.38	0.97	85.36
Minya2 – 8	35.77	28.09	19.59	6.68	4.11	0.00	94.24
Assiyut1 – 8	39.77	20.84	20.31	3.73	3.33	1.84	89.82
Assiyut2 – 8	32.57	25.96	18.19	3.57	1.58	0.00	81.88
Sohag1 – 12	28.42	29.33	15.96	4.65	2.78	1.23	82.38
[Sohag2 – 8 annulled]	[22.70]	[19.14]	[15.41]	[8.75]	[4.82]	[1.50]	[72.32]
Sohag2 – 8 revote	24.87	27.33	11.72	5.39	6.83	0	76.14
Qena1 – 4	32.62	21.88	0.00	8.91	2.40	2.85	68.65
Qena2 – 8	26.03	19.16	4.10	5.99	3.44	0.00	58.71
Luxor – 4	36.90	15.78	12.99	11.06	3.14	0.00	79.87
[Aswan – 4 annulled]	[33.79]	[23.70]	[9.25]	[7.80]	[2.82]	[2.33]	[79.69]
Aswan – 4 revote	35.20	28.19	9.35	10.78	0	2.93	86.44
Total – 96	37.27	26.62	10.43	5.92	3.33	1.37	84.93

PARTY LIST VOTES BY DISTRICT – CANAL ZONE AND BORDER AREAS

District – number of seats	FJP	Nur	Eg. Block	Wafd	Wasat	Thawra	Total
Port Sa id – 4	96,532	61,136	28,510	41,059	38,080	5,460	295,556
Isma iliya – 4	183,859	132,992	31,998	35,637	10,138	5,873	481,384
Suez – 4	75,316	127,836	23,488	12,983	14,396	0.00	280,661
North Sinai – 4	39,315	29,623	1,828	6,389	7,913	0.00	111,221
South Sinai – 4	14,334	0.00	3,766	5,614	840	0.00	33,701
Red Sea – 4	40,693	0.00	19,391	11,049	6,285	4,776	114,022
New Valley – 4	22,792	34,376	6,445	3,449	746	0.00	86,225
Matruh – 4	16,314	76,511	1,977	7,655	3,873	0.00	112,860
Total – 32	489,155	462,474	117,403	123,835	82,271	16,109	1,515,630

PERCENT PARTY LIST VOTES BY DISTRICT – CANAL ZONE AND BORDER AREAS

District – number of seats	FJP	Nur	Eg. Block	Wafd	Wasat	Thawra	Total 6 parties
Port Sa id – 4	32.66	20.69	9.65	13.89	12.88	1.85	91.62
Isma iliya – 4	38.19	27.63	6.65	7.40	2.11	1.22	83.20
Suez – 4	26.84	45.55	8.37	4.63	5.13	0.00	90.51
North Sinai – 4	35.35	26.63	1.64	5.74	7.11	0.00	76.49
South Sinai – 4	42.53	0.00	11.17	16.66	2.49	0.00	72.86
Red Sea – 4	35.69	0.00	17.01	9.69	5.51	4.19	72.09
New Valley – 4	26.43	39.87	7.47	4.00	0.87	0.00	78.64
Matruh – 4	14.46	67.79	1.75	6.78	3.43	0.00	94.21
Total – 32	32.27	30.51	7.75	8.17	5.43	1.06	85.20

APPENDIX E

VOTER TURNOUT

Turnout varied widely across regions, but everywhere the most important contrast was between round one and the subsequent run-offs when participation fell by 40 percent or more in several governorates. Higher turnout in the first round helped the smaller parties increase their shares of seats allotted by proportional representation. Lower turnout in the run-off elections strengthened the hands of all party leaders who wanted to build informal coalitions against common enemies. First round losers could gang up against front-runners more effectively with a shrunken pool of voters in which party organization often outweighed popularity and name recognition.

Turnout Rates in the Governorates (rank order)

Governorate – Total Seats	Eligible Voters	Round one	Run-offs	Falloff rate
Suez – 6	378,917	74.07	43.61	41.12
Isma iliya – 6	696,362	69.13	41.93	39.35
Port Sa id – 6	437,134	67.61	47.56	29.66
Qalubiya – 18	2,583,418	67.15	23.89	43.26
Sharqiya – 30	3,483,914	67.07	34.06	49.22
Giza - 30	4,262,232	66.54	38.18	42.62
Alexandria – 24	3,303,916	65.51	36.68	44.01
Gharbiya – 30	2,918,551	64.44	35.41	45.05
Damietta – 12	849,235	64.01	46.94	26.67
Beni Sueif – 18	1,415,226	63.99	41.40	35.30
New Valley – 6	140,527	61.36	44.85	26.91
Daqahliya – 36	3,691,143	61.21	32.85	28.36
Baheira – 30	3,198,626	59.69	48.41	18.90
Minufiya – 24	2,215,544	58.91	48.01	18.50
Matruh – 6	199,607	56.54	35.15	21.39
Cairo – 54	4,597,893	55.99	36.27	39.54
South Sinai – 6	60,496	55.71	34.21	38.59

Minya – 24	2,644,830	55.31	34.88	36.94
North Sinai – 6	203,346	54.70	19.45	64.44
Kafr al-Sheikh – 18	1,863,834	54.43	40.66	25.30
Red Sea – 6	220,193	51.78	47.10	9.04
Aswan – 6	852,567	51.20	27.22	46.84
Assiyut – 24	2,071,879	50.69	27.77	45.22
Luxor – 6	666,254	48.22	26.93	44.15
Sohag – 30	2,323,098	48.16	37.61	21.91
Fayyum – 18	1,545,556	47.81	35.93	24.85
Qena – 18	1,585,191	43.51	24.65	18.86

APPENDIX F DISPARITIES IN DISTRICT APPORTIONMENT

The unequal weighting of votes across regions and neighborhoods is an enduring problem in Egypt's electoral politics. Even when votes are counted honestly and accurately, many citizens find their power diluted or exaggerated because they live in districts that have been systematically favored or disfavored by ruling elites in both authoritarian and democratic eras.²⁰

Malapportionment is far from random. Indeed, it follows consistent patterns designed to empower specific constituencies while marginalizing others. The problem is pervasive, affecting every region and demographic category including many neighboring communities with long histories of social conflict and rivalry over land, water, and other scarce resources.

In pinpointing the most glaring disparities, we see some common tendencies. In the big cities, boundaries are drawn to strengthen Cairo over Giza and Alexandria. Within all of the cities, commercial districts and middle class residences benefit at the expense of poorer neighborhoods with concentrations of Christians and rural migrants.

In the countryside, villages are favored over towns, fertile lands closer to the Nile are privileged over poorer lands relying on downstream irrigation, and Upper Egypt benefits more than the Nile Delta. The most overrepresented voters live in the sparsely populated border regions and the compact cities of the Canal Zone, but their numbers are too small to affect the national balance of power.

In this election, malapportionment was most helpful to candidates with ties to the NDP and most harmful to the FJP, the new liberal parties, and the Egyptian Block. The Wafd benefited slightly and Nur neither gained nor suffered overall. By skewing results in favor of Mubarak loyalists and against their longtime opponents, the current boundaries accomplished their intended goals—and for that reason alone they should be redrawn.

²⁰ Amel Ahmed, "Revolutionary Blind-spots: The Politics of Electoral System Choice and the Egyptian Transition," *Middle East Law and Governance*, Vol. 3 (2011): 3-12.

DISPARITIES IN DISTRICT APPORTIONMENT – CITIES ELIGIBLE VOTERS PER DEPUTY

List district – number of seats	Voters per seat	Demographic character	Individual District	Voters per seat	Demographic character
Cairo1 – 10	183,177	newer colonial older colonial	1 sahel, shubra 2 hadayiq al-quba, zaitun	547,847 368,038	more Christian more Muslim
Cairo2 – 8	245,852	new suburban old suburban suburban	3 madinat nasr 4 misr al-gadida 5 ain shams, matariya	250,405 190,115 682,578	middle class middle class migrant
Cairo3 – 8	84,987	central central	6 qasr al-nil, abdin, muski 7 gamaliya	127,690 212,257	commercial residential
Cairo4 – 10	180,686	central suburban	8 khalifa, misr al-qadima 9 helwan, ma di	364,122 539,307	older commercial newer residential
Giza1 – 10	211,035	suburban	1 giza 2 bulaq dakrur	634,068 421,105	older center newer suburb
Giza2 – 10	215,189	suburban semi-rural	3 imbaba, aguza 4 al-haram 5 waraq, awsim	424,099 330,323 321,522	newer suburb far west far north
Alexandria1 – 6	277,443	north suburb central	1 montaza 2 ramla	424,192 408,137	older suburban comm'l-res'l
Alexandria2 – 10	163,926	central south suburb	3 muharam beg 4 mina al-basal	436,054 383,576	comm'l-res'l newer suburban

(**Bold** = Overrepresented districts; *Italics* = Underrepresented districts)

DISPARITIES IN DISTRICT APPORTIONMENT – NILE DELTA

List district – number of seats	Voters per seat	Demographic character	Individual District	Voters per seat	Demographic character
Minufiya1 – 8	149,005	town-rural	1 shibin al-kum 2 talla, shuhada	320,113 275,906	town rural north
Minufiya2 – 8	127,939	rural	3 ashmun, bajur 4 minuf, sadat	303,473 208,281	rural south rural west
Shariqiya1 – 10	163,393	city-rural	1 zaqaziq 2 bilbeis	353,257 463,707	city rural south
Sharqiya2 – 10	184,999	rural	3 derab nigm 4 faqus 5 kafr saqr	346,225 318,652 260,117	rural northwest rural west rural north
Baheira1 – 12	140,537	urban semi-urban rural	1 damanhur 2 kafr al-dawar 3 abu hummus	334,037 388,139 314,989	main city second city rural central

Baheria2 – 8	172,861	rural rural	4 kum hamada 5 itai al-barud	304,586 257,563	poor rural west river land
Qalubiya1 – 4	206,616	city	1 benha	413,232	city
Qalubiya2 – 8	219,619	town-rural	2 shubra al-khaima 3 khanka	339,036 539,441	suburban rural
Daqahliya1 – 8	174,548	urban-rural	1 mansura 2 bilqas, talkha	350,744 347,447	city rural north
Daqahliya2 – 8	131,368	rural	3 sharbin, dikirnis 4 manzila, minya nasr	248,584 276,890	rural central salted lake lands
Daqahliya3 – 8	155,477	town-rural	5 mit ghamr, ija 6 sanbalawain	370,660 251,248	rural southwest rural south
Gharbiya1 – 10	137,103	urban	1 tanta 2 basyun, kafr al-zayat	357,267 328,247	city towns
Gharbiya2 – 10	154,752	urban-rural	3 mahalla, samanud 4 markaz mahalla 5 zifta, santa	291,650 201,481 280,481	city rural towns & villages
Damietta – 8	106,154	semi-urban rural	1 damietta 2 kafr sa d	195,475 229,143	dumyat city rural
Kafr al-Sheikh1-8	163,278	rural	1 kafr al-sheikh 2 hamul	371,913 281,197	rural rural, semi-urban
Kafr al-Sheikh2-4	139,404	semi-urban	3 dasuq	278,807	dasuq city

DISPARITIES IN DISTRICT APPORTIONMENT – UPPER EGYPT

List district – number of seats	Voters per seat	Demographic character	Individual District	Voters per seat	Demographic character
Fayyum1 – 8	118,124	semi-urban rural	1 fayyum 2 fayyum, tamiya villages	532,939 206,028	fayyum city rural south
Fayyum2 – 4	150,140	rural	3 sanuris, abshawi	300,281	rural north
Beni Sueif1 – 8	112,243	urban-rural	1 beni sueif 2 wasta, nasr	256,544 192,428	center city rural north
Beni Sueif2 – 4	129,321	rural	3 beba, samasta	258,642	rural south
Minya1 – 8	174,003	urban-rural	1 minya, samalut 2 beni mazar, maghagha	348,677 347,337	city rural north
Minya2 – 8	156,601	rural	3 abu qirqas 4 malawi, dir mawas	309,916 316,486	rural far south

Assyut1 – 8	153,324	urban-rural	1 assyut 2 dayrut, manfalut	249,825 363,471	assyut city rural north
Assyut2 – 8	105,661	rural	3 abnub, fath 4 abu tig, sadfa	263,362 159,282	rural east bank rural south
Sohag1 – 12	116,095	urban-rural	1 sohag, akhmim 2 maghagha 3 tahta, tama	287,130 201,521 207,920	city north far north
Sohag2 – 8	116,245	rural	4 girga 5 baliana, dar al-salam	254,682 210,297	south far south
Qena1 – 4	185,433	town-rural	1 qena, qaft 2 qus, naga hamadi	207,113 311,441	town rural-industry
Qena2 – 8	105,433	rural	3 abu tisht, dashna	274,042	rural north
Luxor - 4	166,564	urban	1 luxor	333,127	urban
Aswan - 4	213,142	urban-rural	1 aswan	426,284	urban-rural

DISPARITIES IN DISTRICT APPORTIONMENT – CANAL ZONE AND BORDER REGIONS

List district – number of seats	Voters per seat	Demographic character	Individual District	Voters per seat	Demographic character
Port Sa id – 4	109,284	urban	1 port sa id	218,567	urban
Isma iliya – 4	174,088	urban-rural	1 isma iliya	348,176	urban-rural
Suez – 4	94,729	urban	1 suez	189,459	urban
North Sinai – 4	50,837	towns	1 al- arish, rafah	101,673	towns
South Sinai – 4	15,124	towns	1 al-tur, sharm al-sheikh	30,248	towns
Red Sea - 4	55,048	coastal towns	1 hurghada, safaga	110,097	coastal towns
New Valley – 4	35,132	oases	1 al-kharagiya, wah khar	70,264	oases
Matruh – 4	49,902	coastal towns	1 mersa matruh	99,804	coastal towns

NOTE ON DATA AND METHODS

All voting data were obtained from open sources and were available online. Official figures from the government electoral commission were checked and supplemented with reports in diverse media, including semi-official, private, and partisan news agencies and websites, predominantly in Arabic and sometimes in English.

In addition to nationwide data sets, files were assembled for each governorate, including maps, tables, demographic data, media coverage, and studies of socioeconomic conditions and ecological problems.

The data analysis follows the lines of my previous studies of electoral politics in Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Nigeria, employing standard methods of cross-tabulation, simple correlation, and mapping.²¹

Like most students of regionalism, my investigations are guided by the enduring insights of V. O. Key, particularly his classic study of southern politics in the United States.²² By imagining that I was exploring Egypt with his eyes, I realized that his theoretical and historical contributions were even more important than his pioneering methods. He argued that after the American Civil War, southern elites skillfully used one-party and no-party systems to fight off populist protest and central government interventions for nearly a century. His explanation of those control systems—their variety, inner logic, and ultimate futility—are essential reading for anyone trying to understand Egypt's current revolutions—both national and local—in historical perspective.

²¹ Robert R. Bianchi, *Guests of God: Pilgrimage and Politics in the Islamic World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

²² V.O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1984).

NOTE ON THE CANAL ZONE AND BORDER REGIONS

The governorates of the Canal Zone and border regions are a scattered set of settlements that still have weak ties to the Nile Valley and to one another. Each is a special collection of segmented communities juxtaposing military bases, government installations, carpetbagging land developers, and tribal societies carrying on a brisk smuggling trade over vast and poorly guarded borders. Because their most distinctive common features are incoherence and detachment, these areas are a non-region. What happens in one governorate often has little influence on the others—indeed, what happens today might not even influence future developments in the same location.

Politically, these outliers are overrepresented and under-organized. Parties with nationwide aspirations have few incentives to invest scarce resources here and usually rely on local elites to marshal supporters in an ad hoc manner. Consequently, electoral alliances are weak and shifting as evidenced by Nur's sudden breakthroughs in Suez and Mersah Matruh and by the precarious position of NDP loyalists, who hung on in the Red Sea while being swept away elsewhere.

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